The £330 Million Question: Palantir's Public Sector Efficacy Under Scrutiny
The incoming prime minister, Andy Burnham, faces an immediate reckoning with Palantir, a US defense and surveillance tech firm now deeply embedded in the British public sector. Central to this debate is a controversial £330 million deal for a Federated Data Platform (FDP) within the NHS, a contract that the science, innovation and technology committee advocates for ditching due to its “clear mismatch with UK values.” The question isn't merely political; it strikes at the core of whether this substantial public investment genuinely delivers on its promise of a digital revolution in healthcare. Some, like former Conservative adviser Camilla Cavendish, champion the firm, arguing that “what matters is what works.” Yet, the efficacy of Palantir’s presence is increasingly being challenged by hard data.
Investigations by Democracy for Sale, utilizing confidential documents, NHS whistleblowers, and internal usage data obtained via the Freedom of Information Act, reveal significant discrepancies. NHS England has publicly hailed the FDP, built on Palantir's Foundry software, as a success, claiming that “almost two-thirds of NHS trusts are 'live' on Palantir’s software.” This narrative of widespread adoption, however, contrasts sharply with the reality on the ground. Internal data indicates that “dozens of the trusts that NHS England says are using the FDP appear not to have logged into a single FDP app in the past year.” This chasm between official pronouncements and actual engagement raises serious questions about the transparency and accountability surrounding such high-value public contracts.
Further drilling into specific applications within the FDP highlights the issue. The Cancer 360 tool, which Keir Starmer lauded as “groundbreaking new technology” capable of “slash[ing] treatment delays across the NHS,” has seen strikingly low uptake. In the nine months since its launch, this critical application was utilized by merely “six out of about 200 trusts.” While Palantir maintains its role as “merely a software provider” and states that usage is “controlled by the NHS trusts,” the stark underutilization points to a fundamental disconnect. This isn't simply an ideological objection from clinicians; it suggests potential practical barriers or a failure to integrate the technology effectively into clinical workflows, despite the significant investment.
This scenario is emblematic of a broader challenge in large-scale public sector digital transformation. When “paid-for political access” and intensive lobbying are identified as factors aiding a Silicon Valley startup's rapid expansion in Britain, it signals a potential skewing of procurement decisions. The focus shifts from objective evaluation of utility and fit to a landscape influenced by political endorsement. The implication is clear: a £330 million investment, intended to modernize a critical public service, risks becoming an example of significant expenditure with underwhelming practical returns. For the UK taxpayer and the NHS, this represents not just a financial cost, but a missed opportunity for tangible improvements in healthcare delivery. The fundamental question remains: if a platform is supposedly live across nearly two-thirds of trusts, yet largely unused by dozens and its flagship tools ignored by almost all, what exactly is being paid for?